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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SELvVYN VANDERPOOL, 
Plaintif f-Rcsponde 11t, 
vs. 
B. K. HARGIS, et al, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11438 
APP·ELLANT'S BRIEF 
STAT~MENT O:F' THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action commenced by Respondent Vander-
pool to collect money allegedly owed to him by B. K. 
Hargis, Pt al, the appellants herein. 
DI8POSI'l'ION IN LOvVER COURT 
On Septl-rnher 12, 19G8 a jury trial was held, Honor-
a hi<· :Merri 11 C. Faux, judge, presiding, which resulted in 
a nrdict by the jur~·, dated September 16, 1968, awarding 
plaintiff juclg<'mt>nt against B. K. Hargis, et al in the snm 
of $9,5G0.00 (R.87). Thereafter, plaintiff made a Motion 
to Com1mte Int<•rest and Incorporate in Judgment (R.85). 
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Plaintiff's motion was ht•ard on .N" owmber 14, 19ti8 and 
interest was added to the judgment by an Order of the 
court da.t<'d November 6, 1968 ( R.89). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPJ£AL 
AppeJlants ask that the verdict of the jury he revers-
ed, or in the alternatin:', that the case be remandPd for 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Hargis, hereinafter ref erred to as Hargis, 
operated and owned a business which sold chinchillas in 
various states. Prior to December 22, 1965, Hargis had 
financed the operation of the business in Pennsylvania 
and adjoining states under the name of The Chinchilla 
Guild of America, Eastern Division, with one Leo 
Crowder managing the operation. On December 22, 1965 
Crowder was notified that Hargis was withdrawing all 
financial support from the enterprise on January 1, 1966. 
In the meantime, allegedly on December 24, 1965. 
Crowder executed a promissory note to the respondent. 
Vanderpool, in the sum of $2,000.00. Vanderpool testi· 
fied (T-122) that Hargis requested him (Vanderpool) to 
lend Crowder "a small amount of money" until a con· 
tract which he (Vanderpool) and Crowder had discussed 
could be executed. Vanderpool then changed his testi· 
mony (T-122, 123, and 125) and stated he had been re· 
quested to lend The Chinchilla Guild of America, Eastern 
Division, the money. 
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Snhseqm,ntly, the Jlarties to the action, Leo Crowder, 
and appellant's attorney met in Las Yegas, Nevada on or 
about Jan nary 1, 19GG and discussed a tentative agree-
Hwnt lwtwrL•n Hargis, Vanderpool, and Crowder. Im-
mediately thereafter, the same persons met in Salt Lake 
City, Utah where Vanderpool, Hargis and Crowder ex-
eeutcd an agreemrnt ( F~xhihit 10-D) and Vanderpool and 
Crowder returned to the state of Pennsylvania. 
The agrf'ement had a blank space regarding the exact 
amount Hargis was to receive for the money he had put 
into the business and a notation was added on the bottom 
of one copy of the agreement which stated "It is agreed 
that the copy of this Contrart is not to become completely 
cffecti1:e (italics added) until the amount owed to Hargis 
is filled in. All other pnn:isions apply". (emphasis added) 
Vanderpool fmtht>r claimed that on approximately 
,January 10, 19GG he was requested by Hargis to lend 
Crowder $5,000.00 more and that subsequent to that time 
lw receivPd a promissory note from Crowder for that 
amount. No note for this amount was placed in evidence. 
~'nrtht>r claims were made by Y anderpool that certain 
t•mnmissions were due him by Hargis, all of which were 
the sub;ject of conflicting evidence. 
Evidene<' was given by Hargis that the exact amount 
11<• wa::; to rPcein· on the agreement was transmitted by a 
ldt<·1· dah•d .January 7, 19GG to Crowder, 'vho handled 
tll<• officP manag<>ment problems in the state of Pennsyl-
vania, for tlw purpose of furnishing information to fill 
in the blank nrnonnt in tht> agrf>Prnent of the parties. 
Crowder then testified that he did not remember receiv. 
ing the letter ( '!1217 -221-250). 
As a result of the above claims, a Complaint was filed 
which alleged that Hargis owed Vanderpool $7,000.00 for 
money lent. The Complaint had no allegations whatso. 
ever of agency or ratification. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONTINUALLY REFUSING THE 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 10-D AND IN FINALLY ALLOW. 
ING ITS ADMISSION ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS (T-264) 
This question is extremely important for the reason 
that the refusal of admission of Exhibit 10-D on numer. 
ous occasions after the execution of the document had 
heen proven and admitted lrn.d an extremely ackerse im 
pact on the jury in that the comments of the trial judgt 
would induce the jury to belieYe that the judge was repri. 
manding the counsel for defendant for some improper 
procedure and would also lead the jury to belieYe that thr 
document was of no legal efficacy and probably not bind· 
ing upon the parties (T-175, T-218, T-244-T-251-'f-264). 
and that the conditions stated by the court upon admis-
sion of Exhibit 10-D (T-264) confused the jury. 
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POINT II 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF AND SHOWS CLEAR-
LY THAT THE JURY WAS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY 
THE ERRONEOUS RULINGS OF THE COURT ON PLAIN-
TIFF'S OBJECTIONS AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE COURT 
TOW ARDS COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
Throughout the trial of this matter, the Court ad-
monished counsel for def Pndant concerning his conduct 
of the case and the order in which he introduced evidence 
(T-121, T-208, T-220, T-245, T-250, T-258, T-259, and T-
268) thus 1wgating counsel's effort to place the facts 
squarely before the jury and hampering, by erroneous 
rnlings on objections, (T-161, T-179, T-185, T-186, T-187, 
T-2:32, T-249) th<~ efforts of counsel to impartially present 
his dt>fense. The transcript shows on numerous occasions 
the bias of the conrt and further shows that the jury was 
influenced to disregard the actual evidence and bring in 
a verdict contrary to the facts. 
POINT III 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AS GIVEN BY THE COURT IS RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR. 
Instruction No. 9 as given by the court introduces 
<11wstiom to he decid.::•d by the jury regarding agency of 
Leo 1. Crowder which was never pleaded by plaintiff, and 
furtlwr allows tlw jury to base its verdict on ratification 
whieh was nevn pleaded nor was ever a proper subject 
to lw in·PsPnted to the jury because ratification eannot be 
rnaintairn-'d or Jll'OVl'n in the absence of a proper showing 
of agenC)'. 
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Defrnclant's <'XtqJtio11 to tlw instruction should be 
upheld for the reasons set forth in 45 A.L.R. :2d 61U 
wherein it is stated 
"But the words used in the pleading must support 
the implication of a technical ratification. It is not 
enough to allege that the defendant received tlu, 
benefits or results of the transaction without the 
further allegation in effect that he did this witl1 
knowledge of the assumption of agency by the ac. 
tual contractor and thus, retrospectively, consent. 
ed thereto". 
It is respectfully snlnnittt>d that not 01w of the abow 
requirement:.; was met by thf' pll'adings of plaintiff (B 
1-3) nor shown by the evidence. 
POINT IV 
THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WRONGFULLY ASSUMES A: 
A FACT, AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, THAT!. 
CONDITION WAS STATED ON EXHIBIT 10-D OR ANY 
OTHER EXHIBIT WHICH HAD ANY EFFECT ON V ANDER 
POOL OR KEPT PORTIONS OF EXHIBIT 10-D FROM BEIN( 
EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID TC 
HARGIS WAS ABSENT. 
No arguuwnt necessary. 
POINT V 
THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 13 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROi 
Instrnetion Ko. l:J is unduly shach•d in fan1r '' 
plaintiff in tbat agenc_,. was not an issw· in this ca::w an 
thpre was no evi<lt>nc·p or proof that Crowd<'r was adin. 
\\·ithin tht• sco]H' of his m1thorit_,, and a compl<>t<' failur 
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of the conrt to instruct the jury that the bnrden of prov-
ing an agent's authority to borrow money is that of the 
person h-'nding the rnonPy. 
POINT VI 
THAT INSTRUCTIONS NO. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
AND 23 ALL CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
'fhe ahove instructions are duplicitous, unduly rep-
etition:,.;, and do not constitute the full statement of the 
l~rn._ 
No arg11111<·nt neees:-ary. 
CONCLUSION 
The condud of tlw trial judge, his erroneous rulings 
and tlw laek of ] lrorwr pleading by the plaintiff all make 
tli•• nrdid of thP jury impossible to uphold. 
On tlw basis of the t•vidence and the obvious facts 
of thi:- eas(~ th1• \-erdid of the jury should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN H. BISHOP 
201 State Exchange Building 
343 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorn(:'y for Appdlant 
